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Expectation Accuracy, Cost Behavior, and Slippery Prices 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relation between the accuracy of managerial demand 
expectations and cost behavior. Based on a unique dataset of 4,107 firm-year observations from 
737 companies in Denmark, this paper first shows that cost stickiness is substantially stronger for 
unforeseen negative demand shocks than for expected demand shocks, which is in line with the 
argument that adjustment costs are typically higher when the time horizon for making the 
adjustments is shorter. Second, we find empirical evidence that omitting selling price changes 
can mislead researchers’ inferences about resource adjustments and cost stickiness when sales 
are used as a proxy for activity level, which is a common practice in the existing literature. 
Finally, we show a moderating effect of managerial expectation accuracy on the relationship 
between demand volatility and cost elasticity. This helps reconciling the ongoing debate on 
whether companies increase or decrease cost elasticity in response to demand volatility.  
Keywords: cost behavior; cost stickiness; resource adjustment costs; managerial decision-
making; slippery prices; demand volatility. 
JEL Classifications: D24; M41; P22. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Manager’s expectations about future demand are central to the theories of cost behavior, 
such as cost stickiness1  (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2013; Chen et al. 
2015; Venieris et al. 2015) and cost elasticity (Banker et al. 2014; Holzhacker et al. 2015). 
However, prior studies on cost behavior usually do not distinguish between accurate and 
inaccurate expectations. Exploiting unique data on managers’ expectations from the Danish 
business register,2 we extend this line of research by suggesting that expectation accuracy is 
negatively related to cost stickiness.3 We derive this prediction from the fact that adjustment 
costs are conditional upon the available time horizon for making the adjustment. Although all 
costs are variable in the long run (Horngren et al. 2015, 55; Varian 1992, 65), ad hoc adjustments 
can be – sometimes prohibitively – expensive. Accordingly, economic theory suggests that firms 
react differently to expected compared to unexpected changes in demand (Hamermesh 1993). 
Specifically, firms surprised by a negative demand shock will not be able to adjust their costs 
downward as smoothly as companies that accurately expected the shock. Therefore, we argue 
that cost stickiness is lower in companies that correctly anticipate future demand. The Danish 
data from the joint harmonized EU program of business and consumer surveys, matched with 
financial statement information, supports our hypothesis. 
                                                      
 
1 Whereas traditional cost models assume that cost behavior can be approximated by a linear function between total 
cost and the level of activity (e.g., Horngren et al. 2015; Noreen 1991), the sticky cost literature shows that costs 
move differently in response to positive compared to negative changes in demand. Specifically, costs are considered 
sticky if the change in costs is greater for activity increases than for equivalent activity decreases (e.g., Anderson et 
al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2007; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Balakrishnan and Gruca 2008; Chen et al. 2012; Dierynck 
et al. 2012; Weiss 2010).  
2 Prior studies in economics (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Amore and Bennedsen 2013) and management (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2012; Dahl et al. 2012) used data from the Danish business register. 
3 Expectation accuracy captures the degree to which managers’ beliefs about future demand coincide with the actual 
path of demand. 
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We continue by investigating the potentially confounding effect of price changes for cost 
stickiness estimations (Cannon 2014). Omitting selling price changes can lead to incorrect 
conclusions (i.e., concluding that costs are sticky when in fact only prices change). Yet few 
studies have included prices, most likely due to data availability constraints. Our analyses 
suggest that price changes can indeed alter the conclusions derived from the standard cost 
stickiness model.  
Finally, we exploit our unique measure of expectation accuracy to revisit the debate in 
the literature whether companies increase or decrease cost elasticity in response to demand 
volatility.4 Whereas Holzhacker et al. (2015) provide evidence for the traditional view that 
companies with higher demand volatility prefer more variable cost structures to reduce 
downward risk, Banker et al. (2014) find that congestion cost can lead to the opposite effect (i.e., 
companies with higher demand volatility prefer more rigid cost structures). We replicate their 
approach and find support for Banker et al.’s (2014) results. Then we investigate the effect of 
demand volatility conditional upon expectation accuracy. We find that the association between 
demand volatility and cost elasticity reverses (i.e., becomes consistent with Holzhacker et al. 
(2015)) for observations where demand decreases and expectation accuracy is high. This result 
provides a potential key to reconcile both prior studies. Not only can prior studies’ findings be 
replicated, but – as will be described later – the conditions under which the effects switch 
direction also seem empirically descriptive of the research settings of Banker et al. (2014) and 
Holzhacker et al. (2015).  
                                                      
 
4 Prior literature often uses the term “demand uncertainty” and measures this variable as the firm-level time-series 
standard deviation of output (Holzhacker et al. 2015, 2316; Banker et al. 2014, 849). We prefer the label “demand 
volatility” for this empirical proxy because even among firms with the same “demand volatility” for some firms the 
demand will be more predictable (i.e., less uncertain) than for others. 
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Overall, this paper contributes to cost behavior research in three ways. First, our findings 
show that the firm’s degree of cost stickiness is contingent upon expectation accuracy. Second, 
we provide evidence that omitting price changes can alter the conclusions derived from the 
traditional cost stickiness estimation approach. Third, this study helps reconcile inconsistent 
findings in the prior literature regarding the association between demand volatility and cost 
elasticity.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Accuracy of Managerial Expectations and Asymmetric Cost Behavior 
Managers’ expectations about future demand drive asymmetric cost behavior. Research 
suggests that, if the adjustment of resources is costly, an executive who is optimistic with respect 
to future demand is more willing to build up or retain resources than a manager who expects a 
prospective decrease in demand. Thus, positive expectations are associated with a higher degree 
of cost stickiness. To test this relationship, several measures are used as proxies for management 
expectations. These include variables such as GDP growth (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker et al. 
2014), order backlog (Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Banker et al. 2014), the tone of forward-looking 
statements in 10-K reports (Chen et al. 2015), analyst forecasts (Banker et al. 2014), intangible 
investments (Venieris et al. 2015),5 and managerial overconfidence (Chen et al. 2013).6 
However, none of these studies have distinguished between expected and unexpected 
changes in demand by investigating whether the anticipated path of future sales is realized. 
However, doing so can alter previous inferences. For instance, higher cost rigidity (i.e., lower 
                                                      
 
5 Venieris et al. (2015) argue that high levels of intangible assets reflect investments in organizational capital that is 
required to support the company’s long-term growth strategy. Hence, high intangible assets are associated with 
optimistic sales expectations. 
6 According to Chen et al. (2013), overconfident managers are more likely to a) overestimate their impact of 
restoring demand when sales decline and b) overestimate the accuracy of their assessment of prospective demand. 
Therefore, overconfident managers are more optimistic with respect to future sales.  
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cost elasticity) can result from a delayed adjustment of capacity. Examples of such unexpected 
shocks can include customer credit failure, the launch of competitive products, and currency 
fluctuations. Moreover, it is often difficult to quickly downsize costs when unexpected demand 
decreases occur, such as due to employee protection laws or company reputation considerations 
(Banker et al. 2013a; Bentolila and Bertola 1990). 
As Figure 1 indicates, adjusting resources to shocks in demand is contingent upon the 
accuracy of expectations. If the firm correctly anticipates an economic downturn, it can initiate 
the necessary steps for resource adjustment before the shock hits; thus, cost reductions can begin 
more quickly once the shock occurs. Yet if the shock is completely unexpected, the firm cannot 
pre-adjust to the actual path of demand. Rather, the decision-maker realizes the shock only after 
it occurred initially (Hamermesh 1993). This leads to a delayed and more abrupt adjustment of 
resources relative to the actual level of demand.  
Economic theory typically assumes that adjustment costs follow a quadratic function 
(Hamermesh 1993, 210). “This means that it is very costly for the firm to move instantaneously 
between static equilibria, because compressing the change in employment into a very small 
period of time causes costs to rise with the square of the change” (Hamermesh 1993, 210).  
Lower expectation accuracy makes it more difficult to smooth resource adjustments. Thus, 
changes may occur more abruptly, which will lead to higher adjustment costs for companies that 
face a convex adjustment cost function (Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). For example, redundancy 
payments will usually be higher for large abrupt layoffs compared to small and gradual 
workforce adjustments.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]  
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In a positive demand shock, companies generally try to increase their output. However, 
companies that do not expect the demand increase are more likely to have higher adjustment 
costs, if they adjust in a shorter time span. For example, hiring more workers in a short period of 
time will probably lead to marginally increasing costs, if the company has to use additional 
search channels or recruit workers further away etc. Similarly, finding a bigger facility to rent 
will be more costly, if the deal has to be closed under time pressure. Additionally, an unexpected 
increase in customer orders may lead to higher selling related costs due to process disruptions, 
for example if the distributing warehouse runs out of capacity or if the usual distributors reach 
their maximum capacity and alternative delivery services have to be found. 
Related to the previous examples, firms that did not expect a rise in demand are more 
likely to respond to a positive demand shock by using overtime work or short-term labor, which 
often requires the payment of a premium. In comparison, marginal costs rise less in companies 
that correctly anticipate positive demand shock. These companies can increase capacity in a 
more timely manner, thereby reducing congestion costs and mitigating organizational 
disruptions.  
Taken together, the arguments about adjustments after positive and negative demand 
shocks explained above suggest that the downward slope is steeper and the upward slope is less 
steep for companies with higher managerial expectation accuracy (see Figure 2). Accordingly, 
the cost stickiness coefficient in empirical estimations would be lower for managers with higher 
expectation accuracy.  
H1: The degree of cost stickiness decreases with increasing accuracy of managers’ demand 
anticipations. 
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Managerial Expectations and Price Adjustments 
Firms do not react to expected changes in demand solely by cutting or adding resources; 
they can also adjust selling prices. Prior literature suggests that adjustments are costly for both 
capacity (Hamermesh and Pfann 1996; Hayashi 1982) and prices (Mankiw 1985; Rotemberg 
1982). To keep adjustment costs low, decision makers choose the least expensive mechanism in 
response to demand changes. Under uncertainty, the optimal capacity and pricing decision 
depends on what is known about demand at the time of the decision and the incorporation of new 
information over the planning cycle (Goex 2002).  
Following Anderson et al. (2003), many studies estimate the elasticity of cost response to 
variations in demand by regressing the change in costs on the change in sales. The statistical 
specification is as follows: 
∆ln ܥܱܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൌβ଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߝ௜,௧, where ߚ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ (1) 
∆ln ܥܱܵ ௜ܶ,௧ and ∆lnSALES୧,୲ capture the natural log-change between the current and the previous 
period in costs and sales, respectively, and ܦ௜,௧ is an indicator variable set to one when sales 
decrease and zero otherwise. In the standard model, according to Anderson et al. (2003), the 
implied association is estimated using SG&A costs. SG&A costs are sticky on average if ߚଵ ൐ 0 
and ߚଶ ൏ 0. The general intuition is that managers retain idle capacity during periods of 
declining demand to avoid adjustment costs (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014). 
However, using sales as a proxy for activity, empiricists may also observe a significant 
cost stickiness coefficient irrespective of changes in labor or capital resources. Specifically, costs 
appear to be sticky if managers adjust selling prices asymmetrically – that is, they lower prices to 
exploit existing capacity when demand decreases but build up capacity (instead of raising prices) 
when demand increases (Cannon 2014). Thus, the investigation of cost behavior based on a 
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model that uses sales instead of actual activity is more precise when selling price changes can be 
controlled for. We will return to this point in the results section. 
Accuracy of Managerial Expectations and Cost Elasticity 
 Based on the arguments above the empirically observed cost functions are contingent 
upon expectation accuracy. Therefore we suggest that managerial expectation accuracy is also 
relevant for the recent work which analyzes the interplay between demand volatility and 
managers’ resource adjustment decisions. Banker et al. (2014) argue that firms will try to avoid 
congestion by choosing a more rigid cost structure (i.e., more fixed and less variable costs) when 
demand volatility is high. This argument challenges conventional thinking by claiming that the 
value of flexibility decreases with uncertainty. Using a combined analytical and empirical 
approach, Banker et al. (2014) show that marginal costs increase with increasing congestion due 
to the convexity of the cost function. Therefore, to prevent expensive bottlenecks, managers 
invest in fixed capacity when demand is uncertain and the likelihood of extreme realizations of 
demand is higher. 
Holzhacker et al. (2015) explore actions through which managers alter the company’s 
cost structure in response to demand volatility and financial risk. Their results show that 
decision-makers deliberately adapt cost elasticity through three main mechanisms: leasing 
instead of purchasing equipment, engaging in flexible work contracts, and outsourcing. 
Interestingly, Holzhacker et al. (2015) find opposite results to Banker et al. (2014) – that is, 
demand volatility is positively associated with cost elasticity. In our additional analysis we 
demonstrate how expectation accuracy can help to reconcile these conflicting findings. We show 
in the appendix how Banker et al.’s (2014) analytical model can be extended to incorporate the 
empirical findings of our study. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Data and Sample Selection 
We analyze 4,107 firm-year observations from 737 Danish companies from 1999 to 2013 
using micro-data from a business and consumer survey conducted by Denmark Statistics that we 
matched to financial statement information.7 This unique dataset provides several advantages. 
Most importantly, the data contain information on managers’ expectations about future demand 
and actual demand development, thereby allowing for the construction of an empirical measure 
of expectation accuracy. In addition, the business and consumer survey also provides information 
on selling price changes that circumvents some empirical design weaknesses in prior studies 
(Anderson and Lanen 2009; Cannon 2014).8 The survey was launched as part of a harmonized 
EU-wide study with the objective of gaining insights into economic trends, short-term 
developments, and potential turning points in the economic cycle (European Commission 2014). 
Authorized Danish research institutions are eligible to submit a project proposal that allows 
approved scholars to purchase access rights to firm-specific data. The interplay between the 
accuracy of managerial expectations, resource adjustment decisions, and price changes can thus 
be studied on a firm basis instead of using aggregate information.  
Following the grouping of the original survey, the allocation of observations in the 
manufacturing, service, construction, and trade sectors is 48 percent, 41 percent, 9 percent, and 2 
percent, respectively. Because the manufacturing sector is the largest and greatest contributor to 
the GDP in Denmark, it serves as the reference group for the following regressions.  
                                                      
 
7 https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/erhvervslivet-paa-tvaers/konjunkturbarometre 
8 Another advantage of the dataset is that potential biases of empirical estimates due to information asymmetry or 
goal incongruence are mitigated because almost all companies in the sample are privately owned (Chen et al. 2012).  
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Raw data obtained from Denmark statistics are provided in separate files for each month 
and sector. The monthly datasets were first cleansed9 and aggregated by year to allow the match 
with the annual financial statements. The financial statement information of private and public 
listed firms on sales,10 operating income, depreciation, total assets, and personnel expenses was 
obtained from the Orbis database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. To ensure anonymity, 
Denmark Statistics (not the researchers) matched the financial statement data with the EU panel 
survey data. We conducted each analysis on Denmark Statistics’ secure server.  
Because SG&A costs are not stated as separate line items, the amount is indirectly 
calculated by subtracting operating income, depreciation, and costs of goods sold (for non-
service firms) from operating sales per company. All financial variables are deflated to year 2000 
DKK values.  
In line with Anderson et al. (2003), observations with missing data on SG&A costs, sales, 
and observations with greater SG&A costs than sales are deleted. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, the sample is trimmed at 1 percent and 99 percent of the distribution. Moreover, 
monthly data on managers’ assessment of future sales over the next three months and 
information on actual sales development of the last three months are necessary.11 We also require 
                                                      
 
9 For example, firm-month observations for which the same company ID occurs in different sectors are allocated to 
the sector in which the firm was listed with the majority of observations. 
10 In Denmark, small and medium size companies only have to report sales; not operating sales. Thus, we use sales 
instead of operating sales when operating sales it is not available. 
11  To reduce the potentially confounding effect of demand volatility, we restrict our sample to observations where 
the reported demand changed at the beginning and end of the three-month reporting period (i.e., change from report 
in t to t+1 and from t+3 to t+4). This approach also safeguards that the following empirical estimations are not 
influenced by the length of the demand shock, as Anderson et al. (2003) suggested. To further alleviate this concern, 
a supplementary robustness check is conducted in which the degree of cost stickiness for firms with a very low 
accuracy of managerial expectations and for firms with a moderate accuracy of managerial expectations is compared 
among companies with the same time frame of the demand shock. Results indicate that potential biases due to 
differences in the length of the demand shock are not a concern in the subsequent analyses. 
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firms to have at least five valid observations for the computation of the dependent variable 
(natural log-change in SG&A costs). 
We tested our hypothesis on two samples. The first sample (i.e., the “whole sample”) 
contains all firm-year observations from 1999 to 2013. To ensure that results are not driven by 
very pessimistic managerial expectations during the financial crisis (Banker et al. 2013b), the 
second sample (i.e., the “reduced sample”) excludes observations from 2007 and 2008. 
Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
We estimated cost stickiness based on the following regression models. Model (2) refers 
to the main model without additional control variables; model (2’) refers to the specification that 
contains all control variables.  
 
Without controls: 
∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌβ଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (2) 
where  	ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧  
 
With controls: 
∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌβ଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ௜ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧൅ߝ௜,௧ (2’)
where 	
 
ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ௜ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧   
The change-specification captures the short-term elasticity of SG&A costs in response to a 
variation in sales and follows previous studies based on the standard model introduced by 
Anderson et al. (2003). ߚଶ is interpreted as the percentage change in SG&A costs per 1 percent 
change in sales. The indicator variable ܦ௜,௧ distinguishes the cost response between increases and 
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decreases in demand. Hence, cost stickiness implies lower cost elasticity for decreases in 
demand, which is reflected in a flatter slope of the cost function (ߚଶ < 0).12 
To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the cost stickiness coefficient ߚଶ is 
contingent upon expectation accuracy. In the case of a negative demand shock, the degree of cost 
stickiness is predicted to be lower for firms that correctly anticipated it. These firms will start 
cutting costs more quickly to avoid a decrease in profitability. Accordingly, our hypothesis is 
supported if ߚଶ is larger (i.e., less negative) in the high accuracy subsample than in the low 
accuracy subsample.  
Similarly, the magnitude of SG&A cost increases is predicted to be lower if a positive 
demand shock has been expected. Predicted effects are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
In our main estimation we split the sample by the median and estimate ߚଶ separately for 
low expectation accuracy firms vs. high expectation accuracy firms. In the additional analyses, 
we also use interactions with a continuous ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ variable. ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ is the natural 
logarithmic transformation of the percentage of months during which future sales were correctly 
anticipated within one year. Because the survey elicited managers’ expectations about demand 
over the next three months and actual demand development over the past three months, 
                                                      
 
12 The log-model has several advantages over the linear model. First, the log-transformation alleviates 
heteroscedasticity and increases the comparability of variables across firms. Second, the logarithmic specification 
produces a more symmetric distribution than the linear model. Third, the logarithm facilitates an interpretation of the 
regression coefficients as elasticities (Anderson et al. 2003). 
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expectations are considered to be correct if the anticipated demand in t is equivalent to the actual 
demand in t+3.13 The calculation is:  
ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ݈݊ሾ%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൅ 1ሿ  
with %ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൌ #௢௙	௠௢௡௧௛௦	௪௜௧௛	௖௢௥௥௘௖௧	௘௫௣௘௖௧௔௧௜௢௡௦#௢௙	௥௘௣௢௥௧௘ௗ	௠௢௡௧௛௦	  
Because the values of %ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ are confined to the interval between 0 and 1 and the natural 
log-transformed values range from െ∞ to +∞, the application of the logistic measure induces a 
more normalized distribution through a reduction of positive skewness.14 An overview of 
possible combinations of managerial expectations and actual demand realizations is provided in 
Figure 3. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Control variables are also incorporated in the slope and intercept of model (2’). Differences in 
adjustment costs and size among firms are controlled for by including the empirical proxy of 
employee and asset intensity (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014) in the regression 
model.15 Employee intensity is measured as the amount of personnel expenses divided by sales 
൫ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧൯, and asset intensity is measured as the amount of total assets divided by sales 
                                                      
 
13 See Table A2 in Appendix 1 for a description of survey questions. 
14 As a robustness check, we alternatively calculate the %Correct variable as # of months with correct expectations 
scaled by 12 months instead of scaled by the number of reported months. This approach reduces %Correct. 
Nevertheless, all results (untabulated) remain substantially similar. 
15 Although the majority of studies do not separately control for size when including employee intensity and asset 
intensity, we conducted a robustness check by testing if parameter estimates differ after including the natural log-
amount of total assets in model (2’). Results are largely robust when we also control for size. 
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൫ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧൯.16 Acknowledging Balakrishnan et al.’s (2014) objections and Balakrishnan et 
al.’s (2004) findings, the model controls for industry differences ሺܫܰܦ௜ሻ and capacity utilization 
൫ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧൯.17 The latter is defined as in Banker et al. (2014), who capture high capacity 
utilization with an indicator variable set to one if sales in the previous year increased and zero 
otherwise. Because prior period sales increases are not available for all firm-years, parameter 
estimates are tabulated separately: first, without controlling for capacity utilization, then, 
controlling for capacity utilization. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Univariate descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The average company in the 
sample generates 453 million DKK in sales (57 million USD) with 102 million DKK in SG&A 
costs (13 million USD) and 104 million in DKK in personnel expenses (13 million USD). The 
mean ratio of SG&A costs and personnel expenses to sales is 32 and 34 percent, respectively. 
The average number of employees is 559, with total assets of up to 80 percent of operating sales. 
Pearson correlations are shown in Panel B of Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                      
 
16 Because the total number of employees is not available for all firms, this study uses the ratio of personnel 
expenses to sales to estimate employee intensity (see also Holzhacker et al. 2015). 
17 Industry dummies are coded based on the Danish 19-group standard industrial classification 
(https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/dokumentation/nomenklaturer/dansk-branchekode-db07). Except for some 
subdivisions, the Danish industry classification is similar to NACE, rev. 2.  
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Validation of the Expectation Accuracy Measure 
The main explanatory variable in this study refers to the congruence of managerial 
expectations prior to a change in demand and the development of actual sales. Descriptive 
statistics are provided in Panel C of Table 1. ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ 1 implies that managers’ 
assessment of the development of demand over the next three months is equivalent to the actual 
realization of demand.18 Panel C.1 shows that 41 percent of sales developments are correctly 
anticipated. The column “all firms” in Panel C.2 indicates that approximately half of all 
companies predicted a demand change and half of the companies correctly anticipated a stable 
demand. Column “Correct dummy = 1” shows that, out of all correct expectations, 25.22 percent 
refer to negative demand changes and 27.55 percent to positive demand changes. This result 
suggests that the managers’ expectations are not strongly affected by overoptimism; otherwise, 
we would expect to see only a significantly smaller proportion of correctly predicted negative 
demand shocks. 
Prices increased in 8.52 percent and decreased in 16.35 percent of all firm-month 
observations (Panel C.3.).19 Thus, companies decrease prices more often than they increase them. 
This is line with Cannon’s (2014) slippery price hypothesis, which predicts that prices tend to 
become lower over time and implies that cost stickiness estimations can be influenced by 
asymmetric price adjustments.20 These distributions are very similar for low accuracy (Correct 
dummy = 0) and high accuracy (Correct dummy = 1). 
                                                      
 
18 See Figure 3 for a detailed overview of possible cases. 
19 Not all firms in the survey report price changes explaining the lower ‘N’ in Panel C.3 compared with Panels C.1 
and C.2. 
20 Specifically, companies’ price elasticity for demand decreases is greater than for demand increases because 
managers decrease prices to utilize existing capacity when demand falls, but increase capacity (instead of prices) 
when demand rises.   
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In Panel C.4, we test whether the ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ in firm-years with a sales increase is 
different from the ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ in firm-years with a sales decrease. The results indicate no 
significant difference, providing further evidence that an optimism bias does not seem to be an 
issue in the dataset. 
Panel D of Table 1 presents the average level of capacity utilization differentiated by 
sales decreases (D.1.) and sales increases (D.2.) as well as correctness of expectations. The 
tabulated figures represent a much smaller proportion of the underlying dataset because capacity 
utilization is surveyed only for manufacturing companies. The level of capacity utilization is 
significantly higher when managers correctly anticipate future demand decreases. This result 
supports nomological validity and suggests that our measure of accuracy is informative about 
managerial decisions. 
In an additional check for nomological validity, we calculate the correlation of 
ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ with gross profit margin. The correlation is significantly positive (p < 0.05), which 
is plausible because companies that can more accurately predict future demand can better meet 
this demand and reduce idle capacity, thereby positively affecting the profit margin. 
Taken together, the results provide confidence that our measure of expectation accuracy 
is valid to capture the theoretical concept of interest. 
Resource Adjustments 
Our main regression model (2) is derived from the standard cost stickiness specification 
introduced by Anderson et al. (2003) and the parameter estimates appear in the first column of 
Table 2. For comparison, results of estimating model (2) conditional on expectation accuracy in 
the whole sample and the reduced sample, respectively, are shown in the subsequent four 
columns. 
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Model (2) does not include additional control variables. ߚଵ is significantly positive 
whereas ߚଶ is significantly negative in all specifications. Thus, costs are sticky on average. |ߚଶ| 
is significantly higher (p < 0.01) for the low accuracy subsample than for the high accuracy 
subsample. This holds for the whole sample as well as the reduced sample. Thus, the asymmetry 
of the cost function is substantially higher in the low accuracy subsample (ߚଶ	 = −0.25 for the 
whole sample and ߚଶ	 = −0.33 for the reduced sample) than in the high accuracy subsample (ߚଶ = 
−0.09 for the whole sample and ߚଶ	 = −0.10 for the reduced sample). The results are also 
economically significant. For example, in the high accuracy column (whole sample), an increase 
of sales of 1 % is associated with a cost increase of 0.98 %. In contrast, a sales decrease of the 
same magnitude (1 %) is associated with a cost decrease of 0.98 + (−0.09) = 0.89 % in the high 
accuracy subsample, but only with a cost decrease of 1.07 + (−0.25) = 0.82 % in the low 
accuracy subsample. Taken together, these results – statistically and economically – strongly 
support our hypothesis that cost stickiness decreases when expectation accuracy is higher.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates based on the full model (2’) that also controls for 
differences in adjustment costs, industry, and capacity utilization. In line with our theoretical 
predictions, the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases with an increase of expectation accuracy. 
|ߚଶ| is significantly higher (p < 0.01) for the low accuracy subsample than for the high accuracy 
subsample. The results are similar using the restricted sample that excludes 2007 and 2008 
observations.  
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Interestingly, cost stickiness is not supported in the high accuracy subsamples (ߚଶ is not 
significant). This challenges the cost stickiness hypothesis when managers can forecast future 
demand accurately. In other words, high expectation accuracy seems to be a boundary condition 
that had not been recognized in the cost stickiness literature before.  
In accordance with Balakrishnan et al. (2004) results, parameter estimates show that cost 
stickiness is more pronounced for companies with high capacity utilization (ߣହ is positively 
significant). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Price Adjustments 
The following analyses investigate how price changes affect the estimation of sticky 
costs. We start by estimating the standard model for cost stickiness as described in equation (2), 
but differentiate between observations with price and without price changes. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows the estimations for all observations in the first column of coefficients, the 
subsample without price changes in the second column, and the estimations for the firm-year 
observations with at least one month during which prices were adapted in the third column. In 
both subsamples (with and without price changes), β2 is negative and significant.21 In line with 
Cannon’s (2014) slippery price argument, the results show that the cost stickiness coefficient 
                                                      
 
21 Excluding all firm-year observations from 2007 to 2008, (untabulated) results are identical. 
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|ߚଶ| is lower in the sample with no price changes than in the sample with price changes. The 
difference between the ߚଶ coefficients in the two subsamples is significant (p < 0.01), indicating 
that cost stickiness studies using sales as proxy for activity may overestimate cost stickiness if 
they do not control for price changes. 
Next, we investigate whether our main results about the relationship between expectation 
accuracy and cost stickiness hold when price effects are ruled out. Table 5 re-estimates our main 
model, as shown in equation (2), for the subset of observations without selling price changes. 
Similar to our results in Table 2 and Table 3, |ߚଶ| is larger for the subsamples with low 
expectation accuracy. Moreover, costs are not sticky when managers’ expectation accuracy is 
high and selling price changes are controlled for.  
In sum, the results support our hypothesis even if price changes, a potential confounding 
factor, are excluded. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Interplay among Cost Elasticity, Demand Volatility, and Accuracy of Expectations 
According to Banker et al.’s (2014) findings, cost elasticity is lower for companies with 
high demand volatility. This result is remarkable because it stands in contrast to the commonly 
held belief that managers prefer more variable cost structures when uncertainty is higher. Banker 
et al. argue that a decrease in cost elasticity reflects investments in fixed capacity to avoid 
congestion when demand becomes high. The association between demand volatility and cost 
behavior is modeled as follows (Banker et al. 2014): 
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∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌβ଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߣ௜ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (3) 
where  	ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧൅ߣ௜ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧  
 
We replicate this specification with our data. Table 6 presents the estimation results using model 
(3), also differentiated by the direction of change in demand in the last two columns. Consistent 
with Banker et al. (2014), higher demand volatility is associated with a more rigid cost structure. 
22 ߚଶ is negative and significant for all observations and for demand increases. However, there is 
no significant relation with demand decreases.23 This finding is in line with Banker et al.’s 
theory, because the congestion of fixed inputs is not a problem when demand decreases. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Our previous analyses have shown that the degree of managers’ forecast accuracy significantly 
moderates the magnitude of cost stickiness. Because higher cost stickiness reflects lower cost 
elasticity, cost elasticity should also be higher for expected demand decreases and lower for 
unexpected demand decreases. This implies that the effect of demand volatility on cost elasticity 
is also mitigated by the degree to which managers correctly anticipate a fall in demand. 
Similarly, cost elasticity should be lower for expected demand increases than for unexpected 
demand increases as managers are more willing to add or retain resources when they are 
optimistic. 
                                                      
 
22 In line with Banker et al. (2014), manufacturing companies are the reference group for all empirical tests. 
23 When we exclude firm-year observations in 2007-2008, it does not alter our results. 
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Banker et al.’s (2014) analyses are based on a formal model (see Appendix 2 for a short 
summary) predicting a negative association between demand volatility and cost elasticity.24 We 
extend the model by Banker et al. (2014) by showing that including down-side costs can alter 
this conjecture in a decreasing market (see Appendix 2). The intuition for our result is that 
demand volatility works symmetrically. When demand volatility increases it results in potentially 
higher as well as lower sales. Thus, increasing demand volatility also results in a higher risk of 
down-side costs (e.g., loss of investments in fixed capacity) due to the risk of lower expected 
sales. Thus, we conjecture that managers who correctly anticipate a fall in demand prefer higher 
cost elasticity. 
In Banker et al.’s (2014) empirical tests, demand volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of the natural log-change in sales across all years for each firm. Based on our model 
extension, we hypothesize that the theoretically negative association between demand volatility 
and cost elasticity in Banker et al. (2014) becomes stronger (weaker) when managers accurately 
expect that demand will increase (decrease). To test this prediction, model (3) is modified as 
follows: 
 
∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ ߚସ ∙ ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧൅ߣ଴ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (4)
where  
ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧ ∙ ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧൅ߣଵ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ 
 
                                                      
 
24 In Appendix 2, we refer to the concept of demand uncertainty, similar to Banker et al. (2014). In our empirical 
part we prefer to use the term “demand volatility” because it describes what our study and Banker et al. (2014) 
actually measure more precisely. 
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Table 7 presents the estimation results using model (4). For the overall sample, the results 
are very similar to model 3, the replication of Banker et al. (2014). However, when the analysis 
is conducted separately for demand increases and demand decreases, the results indicate that 
expectation accuracy moderates the relation between demand volatility and cost elasticity. 
Specifically, in line with the predictions from the extension of the theoretical model in Appendix 
2, expectation accuracy strengthens the negative effect of demand volatility on cost elasticity in 
the subsample of demand increases ሺߚଷ ൏ 0ሻ but mitigates the effect for the subsample of 
demand decreases ሺߚଷ ൐ 0ሻ.25 This confirms our hypothesis that the relationship between 
demand volatility and cost behavior depends on the accuracy of managers’ expectations for 
changing demand. Thus, if a sample is dominated by demand decreases, the association between 
demand volatility and costs becomes stronger with increasing expectation accuracy. This makes 
sense because managers who correctly anticipate a negative demand shock will be prepared to 
cut costs even more when higher volatility represents a greater risk. However, if a sample is 
dominated by demand increases, the effect of managerial expectation accuracy further 
strengthens the negative association between demand volatility and cost elasticity. This is 
plausible because it implies that potential congestion costs can be reduced. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
These results contribute to reconciling the conflicting findings in the literature regarding the 
association between demand volatility and cost elasticity. Specifically, Banker et al. (2014) show 
that costs elasticity is decreasing in demand volatility whereas Holzhacker et al. (2015) conclude 
                                                      
 
25 Exclusion of financial crisis (years 2007-2008) firm-year observations does not change our results. 
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that firms will alter their procurement choices to increase cost elasticity in response to high 
uncertainty. Because the latter study is based on a sample of hospitals, Holzhacker et al. (2015) 
argue that the difference in results might stem from diverging management incentives and 
ownership structure compared with public firms, as in Banker et al.’s setting. Our analysis 
suggests an additional potential explanation. The results show that cost behavior is particularly 
determined by the accuracy of managers’ expectations about future demand. Thus, the difference 
between the previous studies is explained by managers’ capacity adjustment decisions depending 
on whether they can correctly anticipate a positive or negative demand shock. Notably, the 
settings of Holzhacker et al. (2015) and Banker et al. (2014) indeed differ with respect to demand 
growth. Banker et al. (2014) analyze manufacturing firms from 1979–2008, a period in which 
output roughly doubled (Nutting 2016). In contrast, the hospital industry in Holzhacker et al.’s 
setting exhibited a relatively steady decline (measured as patient days). 
Combining our results with the previous studies yields the following interpretation. In 
growing markets, managers of companies with higher demand volatility prefer less elastic cost 
structures (i.e., a higher ratio of fixed to variable costs) than managers of companies with lower 
volatility. This result is in line with the motivation to avoid congestion costs when demand 
suddenly increases. However, among those managers who operate in environments with 
decreasing demand and who accurately predict the decline, the managers of companies with 
higher volatility strive for higher cost elasticity compared to managers of companies with lower 
volatility. Future research could further test our explanation by comparing different industries 
and periods that differ regarding expected forecast accuracy and the frequency of demand 
decreases.  
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Robustness Checks 
Managerial Incentives to Meet or Beat the Zero-Earnings Benchmark 
Companies have an incentive to report healthy earnings to avoid negative consequences. 
These could be related to a greater intervention by banks due to the violation of debt contracts, 
prevention of dividend payments and cash bonuses, or the issuance of going-concern opinions. 
Thus, executives are inclined to manage costs to meet or beat the zero-earnings benchmark. To 
realize necessary cost reductions, firms reporting small profits are more likely to dismiss blue-
collar workers when demand decreases and increase hours (instead of employees) when demand 
increases (Dierynck et al. 2012). On average, this leads to a reduction in the level of cost 
stickiness.26  
To verify that previous estimates in Table 3 are not driven by managerial incentives to 
meet or beat the zero-earnings benchmark, results are subjected to two robustness tests. First, 
regression estimates are obtained based on a subsample by excluding firm-year observations with 
small profits. Second, model (2’) is estimated with an additional control variable capturing the 
effect of small profit firms. This approach follows Dierynck et al. (2012), who select small profit 
firms using a dummy variable set to one if the net income scaled by total assets is greater than or 
equal to zero but less than 1 percent. Untabulated results of both tests show that previous 
findings remain substantially similar.   
Ownership Structure 
Apart from the high accuracy of managerial expectations, a lower level of cost stickiness 
can also result from differences in the ownership structure across companies in the sample. 
                                                      
 
26 Other studies test the impact of managerial incentives on cost behavior by investigating the effect of meeting 
earnings targets or managerial empire building (Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013). 
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Capital market pressure and managerial compensation tied to stock performance have been 
identified as sources of short-termism that induce managers of public companies to avoid 
reporting losses or meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (Bhojraj and Libby 2005; Degeorge et al. 
1999; Roychowdhury 2006). In contrast, the large proportion of family ownership in private 
firms can lead to an alignment effect that incentivizes long-term strategies over short-term 
benefits to preserve family reputation (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2008). Therefore, in 
another robustness check, model (2’) in Table 3 is extended by the moderation of a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the company is public and zero otherwise. Untabulated results 
remain unchanged.  
Additional Cost Categories 
In addition to SG&A costs, we re-run model (2’) using the change in total operating costs 
as dependent variable in Table 3. The behavior of cost of goods sold is not examined because 
changes in inventories prevent stickiness of cost of goods sold. Thus, accuracy of managerial 
expectations is not expected to have a significant effect on this cost category. Overall, 
untabulated results support the hypothesis that the accuracy of managerial expectations 
determines not only SG&A cost behavior, but also the change in total operating costs. 
Accuracy and Endogeneity  
Our theory and empirical tests focus on conditional effects (e.g., the cost function 
conditional upon demand increase vs. demand decrease as well as the cost asymmetry 
conditional upon expectation accuracy). Such relations are less prone to endogeneity concerns 
than main effects in regressions.27 
                                                      
 
27 The method literature suggests using interaction specifications as one statistical remedy to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns since “simulation findings of Evans (1985) and a proof by Siemsen et al. (2010), … demonstrate that 
26 
 
 
In most of our analyses, we split the sample in a low and a high accuracy subsamples. In 
additional (untabulated) robustness checks, we re-estimate all specifications using a three-way 
interaction of ∆lnSALES୧,୲, the decrease indicator variable ܦ௜,௧, and a continuous measure of 
	ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧. All results are robust in these alternative specifications.  
Moreover, we address potential endogeneity issues in those specifications where 
ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ is included as a right hand variable by following a similar two-stage OLS 
procedure as Patatoukas (2012). In the first stage, we regress ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ on the firm-specific 
variables size (natural log of total assets), age (difference between the firm’s financial year end 
and founding year), ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜, and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is 
publicly listed or not. Large firms can invest more in forecasting technology (size), older firms 
likely have more knowledge about their business (age), it is potentially more difficult to forecast 
future demand accurately in high demand volatility environments (ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜), and 
publicly listed firms may be under more pressure to grow (listed). We also add firm-, industry-, 
and time-fixed effects as well as geographic-fixed effects. The latter controls for local trends.  
In the second stage, we rerun all our regressions with ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧, but now with the 
residuals from the first stage instead of ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧. The untabulated results are very similar. 
Taken together, endogeneity is likely not a concern for our results. 
CONCLUSION 
This study uses a Danish dataset combining financial statement information with a 
business survey initiated by a European Union program to investigate the interplay between the 
accuracy of managers’ demand expectations and SG&A cost behavior. Other researchers have 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
although method bias can inflate (or deflate) bivariate linear relationships, it cannot inflate (but does deflate) 
quadratic and interaction effects” (Podsakoff et al. 2012, 564). 
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shown that cost behavior is driven by deliberate resource adjustment decisions to avoid 
adjustment costs associated with adapting resource levels. The level of capacity utilization is 
considered the outcome of these decisions (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2007; 
Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Kama and Weiss 2013). Extending this line of reasoning, we 
hypothesized that the accuracy of managerial expectations is an important predictor of cost 
behavior. Results show that, when a fall in demand was accurately expected, managers 
successfully cut capacity, resulting in a significant decrease in SG&A cost stickiness compared 
to firms that did not correctly anticipate a change in demand.  
Moreover, the study assesses the effect of selling price changes on cost stickiness 
estimations. Analyzing the traditional cost stickiness specification separately for firm-years with 
selling price changes and firm-years without selling price changes indicates that the cost 
stickiness estimate is significantly lower when confounding effects of price changes are ruled 
out. Thus, studies using sales as a proxy for volume might overestimate cost stickiness if they 
cannot control for price changes.  
Subsequently, the study reanalyzes the association between expectation accuracy and cost 
stickiness for the sub-sample of firm-years without price changes. The analyses suggest that the 
main findings in this paper are robust to potential confounding effects of price changes. Even 
when ruling out selling price effects, the cost stickiness is stronger for those firm-years with low 
expectation accuracy compared to those with high accuracy. 
Finally, additional analyses are conducted to test if the accuracy of managerial 
expectations moderates the association between demand volatility and cost behavior. Extending 
the analytical model as well as the empirical specifications introduced by Banker et al. (2014), 
our study demonstrates that the relationship is negative for unexpected demand decreases but 
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positive for expected demand decreases. These results help reconcile contradictory findings in 
the literature that suggest that cost variability is either positively (Holzhacker et al. 2015) or 
negatively (Banker et al. 2014) related to demand volatility.   
All analyses in this study were conducted using data from Danish companies. 
Consequently, empirical estimates are not influenced by national differences in labor laws, 
market conditions, etc. Future studies should assess the generalizability of our findings to other 
contexts. In addition, although the consideration of selling prices as a potential confounding 
variable is a contribution of this study, the categorical nature of the survey data does not allow 
for the measurement of the magnitude of price changes in response to expected or unexpected 
demand changes. Furthermore, the argument underlying the main hypothesis implies that 
adjustment costs occur within the time frame of the empirical tests. However, it is possible that 
some adjustment costs (e.g., negative effects on company reputation or working atmosphere) 
arise with a time lag and are not captured by the empirical tests. Overcoming these limitations 
would be a valuable contribution for future research. Moreover, this study shows how 
managerial expectations impact cost structures, but it does not provide insights into how 
managers derive expectations about future demand. The investigation of these factors, such as 
personal characteristics, analyses, and decision-making processes, and their relation to resource 
adjustment and cost behavior is left to future research. 
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Appendix 1 
 
TABLE A1 
Variable Description 
Variable Name Description Calculation 
%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ Percentage of months during which 
future demand is correctly anticipated. 
#݋݂	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	c݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ
݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ
#݋݂	ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݁݀	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ  
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧ Congruence of managerial expectations and actual demand development. ൞
1 ݂݅	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ	݅݊ ݐ ൌ
ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅݊	ݐ ൅ 3
0 ݂݅	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ	݅݊ ݐ ്
ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ	݀݁݉ܽ݊݀	݅݊	ݐ ൅ 3
 
ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ.௧ Natural logarithmic transformation of %ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ. Captures the accuracy of 
managers’ expectations per year. 
ln	ሺ%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൅ 1ሻ 
ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ Natural log-ratio of total assets to sales ݈݊ ቈܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ቉ 
ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧ Empirical proxy for capacity utilization. Capacity utilization is high 
if prior period sales increased. 
൜1 ݂݅	݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൐ ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଶ0 ݂݅	݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൑ ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଶ 
ܦ௜,௧ Dummy variable for sales decreases between t-1 and t. ൜
1 ݂݅	݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൏ ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ
0 	݂݅	݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൒ ݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ 
ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ Natural log-ratio of personnel expenses to sales. ݈݊ ቈ
ܧ݉݌ܿ݋௜,௧
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ ቉ 
ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ Real GDP growth in Denmark  
ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧ Standard deviation of the natural log-change in sales between t and t-1 ܵܶܦ	 ቆ݈݊ ቈ
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ቉ቇ 
∆lnSALES୧,୲ Natural log-change in sales between t and t-1. ݈݊ ቈ
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ିଵ቉ 
∆lnSG&A୧,୲ Natural log-change in SG&A costs between t and t-1. ݈݊ ቈ
ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧
ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ିଵ቉ 
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TABLE A2 
Excerpt from the Questionnaire of the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and 
Consumer Surveys 
  
Expression 
 
Question Answer possibilities 
Expectations How do you expect demand (sales) to 
change over the next three months? 
 Increase 
 Remain Unchanged 
 Deteriorate 
Actual Demand How did demand (sales) change over 
the past three months? 
 Increased 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorated 
Prices How did the prices you charged 
change over the past three months? 
 Increased 
 Remained Unchanged 
 Deteriorated 
Capacity Utilization28  At what capacity is your company 
currently operating (as a percentage 
of full capacity)? 
Percent 
 
In the survey, specifically see Section 2.2. and subsections 1-2 and 4-6 in Annex 2 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/documents/bcs_user_guide_en.pdf) 
 
  
                                                      
 
28 Question is included in the survey for manufacturing companies only. 
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Appendix 2: Summary and Extension of Banker et al.’s (2014) model 
In their 2015 AAA award-winning paper, Banker et al. (2014) show that higher demand 
uncertainty (higher variance of demand) results in a more rigid cost structure (more fixed and 
less variable inputs), challenging the conventional wisdom (i.e., lower fixed and higher variable 
costs). However, Banker et al. (2014) do not model the down-side costs of, e.g., bankruptcy. 
Although it is plausible that fixed inputs are the bottleneck when demand increases, we 
conjecture that the risk of bankruptcy alters the managers’ cost behavior in a decreasing market. 
When demand decreases the risk of bankruptcy increases and (as a result) managers prefer a less 
rigid cost structure. Following this line of reasoning, we first derive the analytical result in 
Banker et al. (2014) making a few simplifying assumptions to reduce the mathematical 
complexity. 
Banker et al. (2014) study the resource allocation in a risk-neutral firm facing uncertain 
demand. That is, the firm wants to minimize the total cost subject to a given production 
technology ݂ሺݔ, ݖሻ: 
 
min௫,௭ ܧ௤ሾ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭ݖሿ	ݏ. ݐ. ݂ሺݔ, ݖሻ ൒ ݍ                                                                                      (A1) 
 
where ݔ	ሺݖሻ	denotes the fixed (variable) input for producing output ݍ and ݌௫	ሺ݌௭ሻ is the input 
price.  
We assume that the firm’s technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function:  
 
݂ሺݔ, ݖሻ ൌ ݖఈݔଵିఈ ൒ ݍ                                                                                                               (A2) 
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where (without loss of generality) ߙ ൌ ½.  
As the firm chooses fixed input x prior to actual demand is known and variable input z is 
chosen after observing realized demand, the optimal level of variable input z is: 
 
ݖ ൌ ௤మ௫                                                                                                                                          (A3) 
 
Substitution of the optimal level of variable input z into the firm’s cost problem yields: 
 
Min௫ ܧ௤ ቂ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭ ௤
మ
௫ ቃ ൌ Min௫ ቂ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭
ாൣ௤మ൧
௫ ቃ                                                                          (A4) 
 
In their model, Banker et al. (2014) assume there are no inventories, firms always fully 
meet the demand ሺݍ ൌ ݍௗሻ, and the distribution of demanded quantity ݍௗ follows a normal 
distribution:  
 
ݍ ൌ ݍௗ~ܰሺݍ଴, ߪଶሻ                                                                                                                     (A5) 
 
where ݍ଴ ሺߪଶሻ denotes the mean level of demand (demand uncertainty).  
Keeping in mind, that Banker et al. (2014) study how demand uncertainty ߪଶ relates to 
cost behavior. By definition the variance of output ݍ is given by: 
 
ܸሾݍሿ ൌ ܧሾݍଶሿ െ ܧሾݍሿଶ                                                                                                               (A6) 
 
Thus, substitution of the variance of output into equation (A4) yields: 
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Min௫ ቂ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭
௏ሾ௤ሿାாሾ௤ሿమ
௫ ቃ ൌ Min௫ ቂ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭
ఙమା௤బమ
௫ ቃ                                                                    (A7) 
 
The first order condition of equation (A7) w.r.t. fixed input x yields the solution: 
 
ݔ ൌ ට௣ೣ௣೥ ሾߪଶ ൅ ݍ଴
ଶሿ                                                                                                                     (A8) 
 
In equation (A8), the marginal costs of fixed input x (left-hand side) is clearly increasing 
in the size of demand uncertainty ߪଶ (right-hand side). This is the novel result of Banker et al. 
(2014).  
The arguments and calculations thus far have been developed by Banker et al. (2014). 
Extending their model, we show how down-side costs (such as bankruptcy risk) potentially alter 
the cost behavior predicted by Banker et al. (2014). Although it is reasonable that firms prefer 
more fixed and less variable costs to prevent congestion costs (up-side costs) when demand 
increases, we conjecture that firms prefer less fixed and more variable costs if the down-side 
costs are high (e.g., the risk of bankruptcy) when demand shrinks. 
To illustrate our argument we assume that the firm goes bankrupt if demand drops to a 
critical level ݍ where ݍ଴ ൐ ݍ ൐ 0. If demand drops to ݍ, the firm will not produce any output 
ሺݍ ൌ 0ሻ. As the firm invests in fixed capacity prior to observing actual demand, it has to realize a 
loss of ݌௫ݔ.29  
                                                      
 
29 To keep it simple, we assume the fixed input cannot be used in other settings, e.g., a highly specialized machine. 
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Next, we relate the probabilities of different outcomes of demand by the cumulative 
distribution function ܨሺݍሻ. Thus, let ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ and 1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ denote the risk of 
bankruptcy and the probability of “going concern”, respectively. 
Now the equivalent of the firm’s cost problem in equation (A1) can be formalized as 
follows: 
 
min௫,௭ ܧ௤ ቎ቀ1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻቁ ሺ݌௫ݔ ൅ ݌௭ݖሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣.௖௢௦௧௦	௢௙	௚௢௜௡௚	௖௢௡௖௘௥௡
൅ ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ݌௫ݔᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௣.௖௢௦௧௦	௢௙	௕௔௡௞௥௨௣௧௖௬
቏ 	ݏ. ݐ. ݂ሺݔ, ݖሻ ൒ ݍ           (A9) 
 
Given the same assumptions as in equations (A2) and (A5), the equivalent expression of 
equation (A7) is:  
 
Min௫ ቂ݌௫ݔ ൅ ቀ1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻቁ ݌௭
ఙమା௤బమ
௫ ቃ                                                                                (A10) 
 
 Again, we take the first order condition of equation (A10) w.r.t. fixed input x which 
yields the solution: 
 
ݔ ൌ ට௣ೣ௣೥ ቀ1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻቁ ሾߪଶ ൅ ݍ଴
ଶሿ ൌ ඩ௣ೣ௣೥ ቌሾߪଶ ൅ ݍ଴
ଶሿᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ா௤.ሺ஺଼ሻ
െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻሾߪଶ ൅ ݍ଴ଶሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ெ௔௥௚.௖௢௦௧௦	௢௙	௕௔௡௞௥௨௣௧௖௬
ቍ         (A11) 
 
Based on equation (A11), it is clear that the risk of bankruptcy ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ reduces the 
required units of fixed resources x (right-hand side) to restore optimum. That is, the cost 
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elasticity is decreasing in the risk of bankruptcy ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ. Figure 4 illustrates how demand 
uncertainty ߪଶ is related to the risk of bankruptcy ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ. When demand uncertainty ߪଶ 
increases the risk of bankruptcy also increases for a given critical level ݍ.  
Accordingly, we derive our empirical prediction when demand uncertainty ߪଶ increases. 
If the risk of bankruptcy ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ ൌ 0 in equation (A11) then fixed input x is only 
influenced by demand uncertainty ߪଶ. This is equivalent to equation (A8). However the 
introduction of bankruptcy risk in equation (A11) moderates the predictions in equation (A8). 
When demand uncertainty ߪଶ increases the risk of bankruptcy ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ also increases cf. 
figure 4. Thus, ቀ1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻቁ ߪଶ becomes higher but the increase is smaller than in equation 
(A8). However, the right-hand side of equation (A11) also drops by ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻݍ଴ଶ when 
demand uncertainty ߪଶ increases. Thus, higher demand uncertainty ߪଶ can result in less fixed 
input x if ቀ1 െ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻቁ ߪଶ ൏ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻݍ଴ଶ or ఙ
మ
ఙమା௤బమ ൏ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ.
30 The intuition for 
our prediction is that the (expected) demanded quantity ݍௗ (in Banker et al., 2014) now drops 
with the (expected) loss of bankruptcy which is increasing in demand uncertainty ߪଶ. 
 
                                                      
 
30 By definition, we also require that ܨ ቀݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍቁ ൌ ߙ where ߙ ൌ ሿ0; 0.5ሾ. Thus, the inequality only holds if 
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߪଶ ൏ ߙݍ଴ଶ. When ߙ approaches zero (0.5) the costs of bankruptcy decreases (increases) and (as a result) the 
inequality ఙమఙమା௤బమ ൏ ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ is less (more) likely to hold. Consider figure 4, the intuition is that when the critical level of output ݍ approaches zero the risk of bankruptcy vanishes whereas it increases when ݍ gets closer to ݍ଴. 
Thus, it is easier to fulfill the inequality for a high critical level of output ݍ. Naturally, the initial size of ݍ also 
matters. 
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 Taken together, our analysis shows how Banker et al.’s (2014) framework yields 
different predictions depending on whether managers expect higher or lower future demand. The 
implications regarding the association between demand volatility and cost elasticity derived from 
this simple model extension are in line with our empirical findings.  
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics in Million DKK (Million USD, exchange rates in year 2000) 
  
  
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Sales [1] 4,107 453.26 
(57.16) 
1,703.08 
(214.76) 
42.57 
(5.37) 
133.39 
(16.82) 
346.65 
(43.71) 
SG&A costs [2] 4,107 101.52 
(12.80) 
347.05 
(43.76) 
10.96 
(1.38) 
28.26 
(3.56) 
72.97 
(9.20) 
Personnel expenses [3] 4,068 104.45 
(13.17) 
335.03 
(42.25) 
14.22 
(1.79) 
35.86 
(4.52) 
82.25 
(10.37) 
SG&A costs/ Sales [4] 4,107 0.32 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.45 
EMPINT [5] 4,068 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.43 
ASSETINT [6] 4,107 0.80 0.94 0.43 0.62 0.87 
Number of Employees [7] 3,996 559.13 1,795.31 81.00 213.00 464.50 
∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ [8] 4,107 0.02 0.55 -0.36 -0.00 0.34 
ACCURACY [9] 4,107 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.41 0.51 
DEMAND_VOLA [10] 4,107 0.51 0.16 0.43 0.48 0.56 
GDP [11] 4,107 0.88 2.25 0.39 0.82 2.44 
 
 
Panel B:  Pearson Correlation 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] Sales           
[2] SG&A costs 0.68***          
[3] Personnel 
expenses 
0.86*** 0.84***         
[4] SG&A costs/ 
Sales 
-0.11*** 0.11*** -0.03        
[5] EMPINT -0.12*** -0.03* -0.02 0.50***       
[6] ASSETINT -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.10***      
[7] Number of 
Employees 
0.82*** 0.71*** 0.90*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.01     
[8] ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.03* -0.03* 0.03**    
[9] ACCURACY -0.02 -0.03* -0.04** -0.03** -0.03* -0.00 -0.02 -0.01   
[10] DEMAND_ 
VOLA 
-0.01 0.03** 0.02 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.04**  
[11] GDP -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03* 0.00 -0.02 -0.33*** 0.02 -0.05*** 
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Table 1 continued: 
 
Panel C:  Descriptive Statistics Differentiated by Accuracy of Expectations 
 
 
Panel C.1.:      Correctness of Expectations 
 
(Percent) 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 0 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 1 
All firms 
   
 58.75 (N=32,553) 
41.25 
(N=22,853) 
100 
(N=55,206)  
     
Panel C.2.:      Actual Sales Developments and Correctness 
 
(Percent) 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 0	ሺܰ ൌ 32,553ሻ 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 1 ሺܰ ൌ 22,853ሻ 
All firms  
(N=55,404)  
Negative demand change 26.96 (N=8,775) 
25.22 
(N=5,764) 
26.24 
(N=14,539) 
 No demand change 45.06 (N=14,667) 
47.23 
(N=10,794) 
45.95 
(N=25,461) 
Positive demand change 27.99 (N=9,111) 
27.55 
(N=6,295) 
27.81 
(N=15,406) 
 
 
 
Panel C.3.:      Price Developments and Expectation Accuracy  
 
(Percent) 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 0	ሺܰ ൌ 18,823ሻ 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 1 ሺܰ ൌ 13,598ሻ 
All firms 
(N=32,421)  
Price Decrease 16.48 (N=3,102) 
16.18 
(N=2,200) 
16.35 
(N=5,302) 
 Price Unchanged 75.06 (N=14,128)
75.22 
(N=10,794)
75.12 
(N=24,356) 
Price Increase 8.46 (N=1,593) 
8.60 
(N=1,170) 
8.52 
(N=2,763) 
 
 
Panel C.4.:     One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
 ܯ݁ܽ݊ሺܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ.௧ሻ F Value ݌ݎ ൐ ܨ Sales Decrease 0.323 (N=2,180) 0.13 0.71 Sales Increase 0.320 (N=1,927) 
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Table 1 continued: 
 
Panel D:  Average Level of Capacity Utilization for Manufacturing Companies (monthly) 
Panel D.1.:  Demand Decrease 
 
 
(Percent) 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 0	ሺܰ ൌ 613ሻ 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 1 ሺܰ ൌ 422ሻ  
F-test for 
Difference 
Capacity utilization 70.11 72.87  ** 
     
Panel D.2.:  Demand Increase 
 
 
(Percent) 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 0	ሺܰ ൌ 685ሻ 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧
ൌ 1 ሺܰ ൌ 516ሻ  
F-test for 
Difference 
Capacity utilization 77.93 78.48   
 ∗ ܲݎ ൐ ߯ଶ of 0.10, ∗∗ ܲݎ ൐ ߯ଶ of 0.05, ∗∗∗ ܲݎ ൐ ߯ଶ of 0.01 (F-tests). 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧ captures the congruence between managerial expectations about future demand and actual 
demand on a monthly basis. ܥܱܴܴܧܥܶ_ܦܷܯܯ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ 1 if the manager’s expectation in t is equivalent to the actual 
change in demand in t+3. The difference is three months because the survey asks for the expected change in demand 
for the next three months and the actual development of demand over the past three months. See Figure  for an 
overview of all possible cases. 
 
ܯ݁ܽ݊ሺܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ.௧ሻ is the mean annual level of ݊ܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ	log	ሺ%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൅ 1ሻ with 
%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൌ #݋݂	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ/#݋݂	ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݁݀	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ	. 
 
The level of capacity utilization is retrieved from the survey questionnaire for manufacturing companies. See Table 
A1 in Appendix 1 for the description of the variable. 
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TABLE 2 
Cost Stickiness Estimations Conditional upon Expectation Accuracy, Model (2)  
  
Model (2) ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, where  ߚ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧ 
 
 
  
Whole 
Samplea Whole Sample
a  Reduced Sampleb 
    
 High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
 High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Estimate (t-statistic) 
 Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
 Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ -0.05*** 
(-4.22) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.32) 
-0.06***
(-3.73) 
 -0.05** 
(-2.27) 
-0.08*** 
(-4.48) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 1.02***
(45.37) 
 0.98***
(27.35) 
1.07***
(38.93) 
 0.98*** 
(25.71) 
1.09*** 
(37.61) 
ࢼ૛ ࡰ࢏,࢚ ∙ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ − -0.17***
(-4.74) 
 -0.09** 
(-1.79) -0.25***(-4.89) 
 -0.10* 
(-1.61) 
-0.33*** 
(-4.73) 
ߚଷ ܦ௜,௧ േ -0.01 (-0.87) 
 -0.01 
(-0.52) 
-0.02 
(-0.75) 
 -0.00 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
ߣ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧  no  no no  no no 
n   4,107  2,064 2,043  1,707 1,710 
Adj. R2  0.67  0.67 0.71  0.59 0.68 
 
a  Whole sample, including all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013. 
b Reduced sample includes all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013, excluding firm-year observations 
from 2007 and 2008. 
 
*,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
 
High Accuracy (Low Accuracy) denotes the subsample above (below) the median (i.e., the 50th percentile) of 
ACCURACY. 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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TABLE 3 
Cost Stickiness Estimations Conditional upon Expectation Accuracy, Model (2’)  
Model (2’): 
 
∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ௜ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧൅ߝ௜,௧,  
where ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ௜ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ 
Panel A: Whole Samplea  Model (2’) 
   
Not controlling for 
capacity utilization  
Controlling for 
capacity utilization 
   
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ 0.03 (0.93) 
-0.03 
(-1.05) 
0.04 
(1.01) 
-0.05* 
(-1.58) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 0.98*** (26.42) 
1.06*** 
(38.77) 
0.98*** 
(25.81) 
1.06*** 
(37.26) 
ࢼ૛ ࡰ࢏,࢚ ∙ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ െ 0.03 
(0.30) 
-0.27*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.11 
(-0.82) 
-0.52*** 
(-2.86) 
ߚଷ ܦ௜,௧ േ -0.02 
(-0.68) 
-0.03 
(-1.00) 
-0.04 
(-1.28) 
-0.04* 
(-1.47) 
Controls  
    
ߣଵ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.07* 
(1.45) 
-0.03 
(-0.76) 
0.08* 
(1.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.70) 
ߣଶ ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.04** 
(2.06) 
0.02 
(1.22) 
0.04** 
(1.87) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
ߣଷ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.04 
(-0.13) 
0.02 
(0.79) 
-0.00 
(-0.09) 
ߣସ ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 0.01 
(0.64)
-0.02* 
(-1.32)
0.00 
(0.09) 
-0.02* 
(-1.53)
ߣହ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧ 
 
 
 
0.16** 
(1.67) 0.25* (1.60) 
ߣ଺ ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧ 
 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.68) 0.00 (0.05) 
ߣଵ௫ Industry slope and main effect 
 
yes yes yes yes 
n  
 
2,042 2,022 1,862 1,826 
Adj. R2 
 
0.63 0.71 0.65 0.72 
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Table 3 continued: 
 
Panel B: Reduced Sampleb  Model (2’) 
   
Not controlling for 
capacity utilization  
Controlling for 
capacity utilization 
   
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ 0.03 (0.77) 
-0.05* 
(-1.58) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
-0.08** 
(-2.14) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 0.99*** (24.83) 
1.09*** 
(37.29) 
0.99*** 
(24.22) 
1.09*** 
(35.56) 
ࢼ૛ ࡰ࢏,࢚ ∙ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ െ 0.07 
(0.47) 
-0.33*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.22 
(-1.08) 
-0.87*** 
(-3.20) 
ߚଷ ܦ௜,௧ േ -0.00 
(-0.10) 
-0.02 
(-0.72) 
-0.04 
(-1.10) 
-0.06** 
(-1.66) 
Controls  
    
ߣଵ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.05 
(0.68) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
0.06 
(0.88) 
-0.03 
(-0.48) 
ߣଶ ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.05** 
(2.10) 
0.02 
(1.04) 
0.05** 
(1.91) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
ߣଷ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
-0.02 
(-0.85) 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
ߣସ ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧ 
 
0.00 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(-1.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.02* 
(-1.40) 
ߣହ ܦ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧ 
 
 
 
0.32** 
(2.20) 0.51** (2.31) 
ߣ଺ ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧ 
 
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.68) -0.00 (-0.00) 
ߣଵ௫ Industry slope and main effect  yes yes yes yes 
n   1,691 1,693 1,517 1,507 
Adj. R2  0.59 0.69 0.61 0.70 
 a Whole sample, including all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013. 
b Reduced sample includes all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013, excluding firm-year observations 
from 2007 and 2008. 
 
*,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
 
The following control variables ൫ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧൯ are included as both fixed effects as well as interaction effects: 
employee intensity	൫ܧܯܲܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧൯, asset intensity	൫ܣܵܵܧܶܫܰ ௜ܶ,௧൯, industry classification	ሺܫܰܦ௜ሻ, and the empirical 
proxy for capacity utilization ൫ܥܣܲܣ௜,௧൯.  
 
High Accuracy (Low Accuracy) denotes the subsample above (below) the median (i.e., the 50th percentile) of 
ACCURACY. 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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TABLE 4 
Selling Price Changes and the Standard Estimation of Cost Stickiness 
Model (2) ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, where  ߚ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧ 
 
   
All 
observations 
No price 
changes 
With price 
changes  
       
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic)  
ߚ଴ Intercept േ
-0.06*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.70)  
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 
1.04*** 
(33.94) 
1.00*** 
(17.20) 
1.06*** 
(29.40)  
ࢼ૛ ࡰ࢏,࢚ ∙ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ െ 
-0.21*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.16** 
(-1.93) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.93)  
ߚଷ ࡰ࢏,࢚ േ 
-0.00 
(-0.22) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.47)  
       
n   2,798 873 1,925  
Adj. R2   0.62 0.59 0.63  
 
 *,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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TABLE 5 
Cost Stickiness Estimation for the Subsample without Selling Price Changes, Conditional 
upon Expectation Accuracy, Model (2)  
 
Model (2) ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, where  ߚ௜,௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦ௜,௧ 
 
  No Price Changes 
   Whole Sample
a  Reduced Sampleb 
   
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
High 
Accuracy 
Low 
Accuracy 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ -0.05* (-1.58) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.06** 
(-1.78) 
-0.13*** 
(-3.49) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 0.93*** (9.95) 
1.07*** 
(15.99) 
0.95*** 
(9.98) 
1.08*** 
(15.95) 
ࢼ૛ ࡰ࢏,࢚ ∙ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ െ -0.02 
(-0.14) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.05 
(-0.31) 
-0.31*** 
(-2.34) 
ߚଷ ܦ௜,௧ േ -0.00 
(-0.04) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
       
n   444 429 393 379 
Adj. R2 
 
0.57 0.61 0.55 0.57 
 
a  Whole sample, including all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013. 
b Reduced sample includes all firm-year observations between 1999 and 2013, excluding firm-year observations 
from 2007 and 2008. 
 
*,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
 
High Accuracy (Low Accuracy) denotes the subsample above (below) the median (i.e., the 50th percentile) of 
ACCURACY. 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of Demand Volatility on Cost Elasticity, Modeled According to Banker et al. 
(2014) 
 
Model (3): ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ߣ଴ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,  
where   ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧൅ߣଵ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ 
   Model (3) 
   
All 
Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ -0.03*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
-0.14*** 
(-4.52) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 1.08*** 
(24.09) 
1.11*** 
(14.77) 
0.81*** 
(10.95) 
ࢼ૛ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ ∙ ࡰࡱࡹ࡭ࡺࡰ_ࢂࡻࡸ࡭࢏,࢚ െ -0.23*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.29*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.08 
(-0.99) 
 
 
Controls      
ߣଵ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧  
-0.02*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.01 
(-0.91) 
0.04** 
(1.79) 
ߣଶ ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧  
-0.01** 
(-1.88) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.78) 
0.03*** 
(3.28) 
ߣଵ௫ Industry slope and main effect  yes yes yes 
n   4,105 2,179 1,926 
Adj. R2   0.67 0.48 0.37 
      
 *,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm.  
The following control variables ൫ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧൯ are included as both fixed effects as well as interaction effects: GDP 
growthሺܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ሻ and industry classification	ሺܫܰܦ௜ሻ. 
 
ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧ ൌ STD൫∆lnSALES୧,୲൯ 
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Demand Volatility on Cost Elasticity Moderated by Accuracy of Expectations 
Model (4): ∆ln ܵܩ&ܣ௜,௧ ൌ β଴ ൅ ߚ௜,௧ ∙ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ൅ ߚସ ∙ ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧൅ߣ଴ ∙ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,  
where 			ߚ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ∙ 	ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧൅ߚଷ ∙ ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧ ∙ ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧൅ߣଵ ∙
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ 
   Model (4) 
   All Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
Coeff. Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
ߚ଴ Intercept േ -0.03*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.02 
(-1.05) 
-0.16*** 
(-4.60) 
ࢼ૚ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ + 1.09*** 
(24.35) 
1.12*** 
(15.25) 
0.81*** 
(11.01) 
ࢼ૛ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ ∙ ࡰࡱࡹ࡭ࡺࡰ_ࢂࡻࡸ࡭࢏,࢚ െ -0.22*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.22** 
(-1.95) 
-0.20** 
(-2.09) 
ࢼ૜ ∆ܔܖ܁ۯۺ۳܁ܑ,ܜ ∙ ࡰࡱࡹ࡭ࡺࡰ_ࢂࡻࡸ࡭࢏,࢚
∙ ࡭࡯࡯ࢁࡾ࡭࡯ࢅ࢏,࢚ 
െ/൅a -0.06 
(-0.76) 
-0.28** 
(-2.08) 
0.40** 
(2.33) 
ߚସ ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ,௧ + -0.01 
(-0.72) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
0.08** 
(1.77) 
      
Controls       
ߣଵ ∆lnSALES୧,୲ ∙ ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
 
-0.02*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
0.04** 
(1.77) 
ߣଷ ܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ 
 
-0.01** 
(-1.87) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.78) 
0.03*** 
(3.21) 
ߣଵ௫ Industry slope and main effect  yes yes yes 
n   4,105 2,179 1,926 
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Table 7 continued:     
   Model (4) 
   
All 
Observations  
Demand 
Increase 
Demand 
Decrease 
Adj. R2   0.67 0.48 0.37 
 a – (+) for demand increase (decrease). 
 
*,**, and *** indicate one-sided significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses are the t-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
The following control variables ൫ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧൯ are included as both fixed effects as well as interaction effects: GDP 
growth ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ሻ and industry classification	ሺܫܰܦ௜ሻ. 
 
ܦܧܯܣܰܦ_ܸܱܮܣ௜,௧ ൌ STD൫∆lnSALES୧,୲൯ 
ܣܥܥܷܴܣܥ ௜ܻ.௧ ൌ natural	logሺ%ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൅ 1ሻ with %ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ ൌ #݋݂	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ/#݋݂	 ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݁݀	݉݋݊ݐ݄ݏ.  
 
See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a description of all variables. 
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FIGURE 1 
Resource Adjustment under Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 Adapted from Hamermesh (1993, 224). 
The figure shows how managers adjust resources differently in response to expected compared to unexpected 
changes in demand. Specifically, when a drop in demand is expected, managers can prepare to start cutting 
resources quickly after the demand shock hits. When a drop in demand is unexpected, the adjustment is delayed and 
less smooth. 
 
 
  
Resource adjustment when demand shock is less accurately expected 
Resource adjustment when demand shock is more accurately expected 
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FIGURE 2 
Illustration of Predicted Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The above figure illustrates the predicted effects. ߚଵ captures the percentage increase in SG&A costs per one percent increase in activity. If the increase of SG&A costs is less for companies with a high accuracy of managerial 
expectations, then ߚଵ+ߚଷ ൏ ߚଵ. The slope of the cost function for activity decreases as estimated through the sum of ߚଵ and ߚଶ. If costs are sticky on average, then ߚଵ ൐ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ. According to our hypothesis, the degree of cost stickiness decreases with increasing accuracy of managerial expectations. For negative demand changes, this implies 
that |ߚଶ| is larger in the high accuracy subsample than in the low accuracy subsample.   
 
  
SG&A 
Costs
ߚ1+ ߚ2
ߚ1
ܦ௜,௧=1
Activity Increase Activity Decrease 
ܦ௜,௧=0
Low Accuracy 
High Accuracy 
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FIGURE 3 
Case Example for Estimating the Variable ۱۽܀܀۳۱܂_۲܃ۻۻ܇ܑ,ܜ 
࡯ࡻࡾࡾࡱ࡯ࢀ_ࡰࢁࡹࡹࢅ࢏,࢚ ൌ 1 
 Expected demand in next 
three months 
(reported in t)  
Actual demand in previous 
three months 
(reported in t+3) 
Case a) Demand Increase  Demand Increase 
Case b) Demand Decrease  Demand Decrease 
Case c) No Change in Demand  No Change in Demand 
 
 
࡯ࡻࡾࡾࡱ࡯ࢀ_ࡰࢁࡹࡹࢅ࢏,࢚ ൌ ૙ 
 
Expected demand in next 
three months 
(reported in t)  
Actual demand in previous 
three months 
(reported in t+3) 
Case a) Demand Increase  Demand Decrease 
Case b) Demand Decrease  Demand Increase 
Case c) No Change in Demand  Demand Decrease 
Case d) No Change in Demand  Demand Increase 
Case e) Demand Increase  No Change in Demand 
Case f) Demand Decrease  No Change in Demand 
 
The information on expected demand and actual demand are obtained from the Danish tendency survey conducted 
as part of the Joint Harmonized EU Program of Business and Consumer Surveys 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm). The survey question refers to 
managers’ expectations about demand over the next three months and the actual demand development during the 
past three months. Therefore, expected demand at t and actual demand in t+3 are compared.  
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FIGURE 4 
Association between demand uncertainty and the risk (cumulative probability) of 
bankruptcy for a given level of output ࢗ 
 
 
 
The figures show that more demand uncertainty ߪ2 results in higher risk of bankruptcy ܨሺݍ ቚݍ ൏ ݍሻ.  
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